today at 4:29 AM
I am sorry, this is "Resolved"? How can they even consider marking this resolved in any situation. Yeah we exposed your env vars but we told you about it over email so it's all good... We dont know how or to what extend though.
today at 9:16 AM
What would you consider appropriate action for their incident team to be able to mark the incident on their status page as resolved?
today at 9:35 AM
Never put it resolved
today at 5:08 AM
The biggest case for building bespoke software is that you drop your attack surface area and it’s not as lucrative to hack one person. Don’t even expose it to the internet if you don’t need to and just run Tailscale.
today at 6:37 AM
I think you've just explained why people rent infrastructure.
today at 7:48 AM
This is probably correct if you aren’t a target at all, e.g. you aren’t running a business
today at 9:18 AM
Tailscale got hacked recently as well, didnt they (?). I think they did, the whole system is poisoned, because I believe one of the vectors had to do with eMudhra certs, which again, is not an issue specific to them, or something they had any say on it... there is literally no escape these days it would seem.
today at 10:02 AM
tailscale got hacked recently? sources?
they had a priviledge escalation vulnerability that requires the attacker to already be a part of the tailnet, and more specifically allows a user-to-root escalation devices the attacker can tailscale ssh to.
> Not trying to play down the vuln (its important), but its not a free-for-all RCE that some ppl are acting like it is. [1]
eMudhra/TLS certificates have nothing to do with this (?).
[1] https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=50266179
today at 4:12 AM
It’s bold to set status page incident to resolved.
today at 4:35 AM
If they fixed the exploit then what do you want them to do? Do they need to wait an arbitrary amount of time before setting it to resolved?
today at 4:48 AM
I don't disagree with you, but I think generally when the mistake involves compromised user data, the answer is a bit more emotionally driven. People get rightfully mad when things like that happens, and services usually keep the incident in a "Mitigated" status while they "work with their customers to ensure blah blah blah" or whatever. Everywhere I've personally worked the Mitigated->Resolved involves publishing a postmortem, repair items, and general assurances or safe guards based on learnings from the incident that the issue won't happen again. However, the industry as a whole doesn't have a standard for what the line between Mitigation and Resolution is.
today at 5:07 AM
So the active incident is now fixed and they've already reached out to impacted customers but they can't mark it as resolved yet because they are still yet to publish a more detailed blog post?
today at 5:35 AM
It's not that they can't mark it as resolved. It's just that it is bad business to do so.
How they handle the communication on the incident is crucially as important as remediating the original cause.
Just the fact that they are doing this means I will probably never use this service or recommend this service to anyone else.
today at 5:46 AM
Okay so let's just say you are one of those affected users
The founder of the company has already emailed you with details and their support team is around for you to ask any follow-up questions. Also the bug/exploit has been fully fixed
At this point are you saying you would actually be upset and leave because the incident on their status page has been marked as resolved?
today at 5:56 AM
Yes.
today at 6:09 AM
Drama queens
today at 6:53 AM
What makes you think it's fixed? They just state that they "blocked the exploit", and that could mean anything:
- did they just take the affected API offline?
- or did they just disable the account of the attacker?
- or is the exploit actually being fixed?
Environment variables are sensible data, and marking a security incident as resolved with that little detail is quite a take. Even changelog entries for harmless bug fixes are more detailed.
today at 7:08 AM
I assume it's fixed based on it being marked resolved and from what was communicated. Yeah I agree it's a major issue but if it's fixed what they have done so far seems totally fine
today at 7:12 AM
they could have explained a bit better with proper postmortem and steps taken to improve, before marking it as resolved
today at 7:58 AM
They are no longer exposing anything, so they no longer have an incident.
Their customers now have an incident that will be resolved once their secrets are rotated. Maybe they also need to do previous intrusion forensics… In any case, not triggers problem anymore.
today at 4:37 AM
I like the fancy gradient INCIDENT REPORT image as well. At least it looks fancy and AI-ey
today at 6:58 AM
This also happened to a trigger.dev competitor a few months ago, inngest.
I was able to patch before it was exploited but that definitely made me question the service.
today at 3:25 AM
Have any of these companies disclosed the actual vulnerabilities used to gain access to their systems?
today at 4:41 AM
No. Which may mean they don't know.
today at 7:32 AM
the recent CVE making any non-patched TCP exposed linux server RCE-root-able seems like a good stretch to me.
But could also be any of the recent supply chain attacks hitting a dev too i guess
today at 5:07 AM
So at this rate, how long before people start hiding use of AI in development of in their SaaS and services? or people really don't care, do they?
today at 8:47 AM
Hand-made code is riddled with dirty hacks and exploits that LLMs have no problem finding. I would not trust any software that is not using frontier models to fix the messy human code.
today at 9:00 AM
Oh that is right, the frontier models yield amazing architecture and secure code in the form of aislop.
There is a difference between using AI to find bugs in written software than using AI to write bug free software, completely different set of skills and outcomes. Most of the high profile stuff you see is AI being driven by people who would have solved the same problem just in slower time going through the code. AI is as good as the operator.
today at 4:10 AM
today at 4:50 AM
Holy smokes, is security just not a priority at all anymore? Like in what world do we live in, that this is acceptable. And at the volume this has been happening, bad guys are having a FIELD DAY.
today at 5:18 AM
What makes you think security was ever a priority?
today at 5:41 AM
The very fact that Nextjs vibe projects need an external (and paid!) background jobs / async service show how much of an anti pattern that this framework and similar are. Just use a sensible stack from day one that can handle concurrency out of the box like Elixir or something with established open source background jobs library. Then you can worry less about this kind of paid 3rd party nonsense. Ditto on auth. I just can't fathom outsourcing these types or core functionalities, the operational, security and cost risks make very little sense when there's libraries that do this out of the box.
today at 5:49 AM
Yes, outsourcing these kinds of core functionality (your queue, your users table!) is insane to me.
today at 6:16 AM
today at 5:09 AM
Given the recent Claude Code remote access tool, it would be wise to not install any new software, or use any package manager for a few weeks as they could have already been silently backdoored during the aftermath of that incident.
today at 7:33 AM
I was paranoid enough to just remove all my Chrome/VSCode etc extensions.
Im now thinking about just running tart VM's on my mac to do my regular stuff from.
today at 8:22 AM
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