today at 7:24 PM
While this confirms the method of production it doesn't say anything about their selection, especially since they were, apparently, generated over a period of months. Specifically you cannot see those candidates that were generated and discarded.
"It is still conceivable that these curves were selected to have a specific property in principle by searching over timestamps to the random number generator."
Yes.
"However, you would only need to do that if you were going to disclose the timestamp as some evidence that the seed was innocuously generated."
Does not logically follow when "doing and saying nothing" will completely suffice.
today at 10:15 PM
Given how expensive this computation would have been in 1997, it makes perfect sense they'd taken months, but even if we assume they tried all timestamps of 1997 and selected arbitrarily among the first 16 viable candidate of any timestamp, that's just ~30 bits of freedom.
Finding out there is a class of weak 256-bit elliptic curves so large that they can be hit randomly with 2^30 tries would be a cryptanalytic breakthrough analogous to discovering all elliptic curve cryptography is broken.
Read section 3.1 of the Koblitz and Menezes paper. It was already implausible with 160 bits of freedom. https://eprint.iacr.org/2015/1018
If you want to believe the NSA knows ECC is broken and chose to risk moving the US government to it and somehow no one figured out the same break in 30 years, you're free to do so. But pretending the seed choice plays any role in that theory is over.
today at 10:11 PM
I think it does rule out any NOBUS vulnerability with these curves, doesn't it? My thinking may be a bit sloppy here, but for a curve to be NOBUS exploitable with N-bit security by its creators, I think it would have to have a property only shared by 1/(2^N) curves. It would be impractical to hash 2^(N-1) timestamps until you find one with the desired property, for any decent size of N--which is how many you'd have to do on average before finding one with that property.
today at 9:02 PM
> While this confirms the method of production it doesn't say anything about their selection, especially since they were, apparently, generated over a period of months. Specifically you cannot see those candidates that were generated and discarded.
Well, at least now we have a way to perform that analysis! Generate a bunch of curves by varying (along any degree of freedom) the input parameters to the seed generating function and see if there's any difference between the curves that are generated.
today at 7:27 PM
God bless you for keeping this alive.
today at 7:33 PM
It doesn't prove anything about the core part of the suspicion, which is they were selected using some undisclosed criteria, which may make them weaker or stronger than some other random numbers.
You are entirely familiar with the precedent of the DES s boxes of course, where that is exactly what happened.
today at 7:35 PM
> which may make them weaker or stronger than some other random numbers
Are there non-trivial weaker and stronger seeds for this category of elliptic curves?
today at 7:38 PM
Exactly.
When they made the changes to the s boxes for differential cryptanalysis resistance the entire concept of that was essentially secret, so who knows what they know about elliptic curves.
today at 8:11 PM
The number of weak classes of elliptic curve would have to be gargantuan for this specific search to produce some. If that many curves are bad, then ECC was a mistake.
today at 9:12 PM
drand48() could be one of hundreds of methods that were tried to produce specific values with plausible deniability and happened to produce them. The other searches were discarded.
today at 9:13 PM
Then why not turn this around and say which (hopefully small set of) specific classes of curves are known to be avoided, but otherwise have a free for all?
> If that many curves are bad, then ECC was a mistake.
I mean that is the logical conclusion from the behaviour around this approach where a few good things are effectively endorsed without justification.
The fact is any application of an algorithm that involves so much "trust me bro" on the selection of what are a large number of opaque quasi random but not quite or provably so numbers only has as much trust in it as you have in the people that created it.
today at 8:12 PM
Again, Koblitz and Menezes take this idea on directly in their paper. But I mean, at this point, nobody serious is going to take the P-curve seed conspiracy theory seriously ever again.
today at 8:04 PM
If you keep posting like this you're gonna get microwaved from space ;)
today at 9:27 PM
I'm only posting like this because they already are.
today at 9:54 PM
Check out 133784883 then, it really gets the machine going.
today at 10:18 PM
> 133784883
Ghislaine Maxwell's social security number?
today at 8:03 PM
"However, you would only need to do that if you were going to disclose the timestamp as some evidence that the seed was innocuously generated."
And the disclosure happened now through Anthropic that is 100% not going to anger the NSA before the IPO and will have permission.
today at 7:17 PM
“In under half an hour, Claude discovered the origins of the NIST P-192, P-224, P-256, P-384 and P-521 seeds. None of them were the results of any hash algorithm at all, but rather the output of the C library’s lrand48 random-number generator, seeded with a Unix timestamp!”
Gorgeous. I wonder if the NSA employee who did this suffered a head injury or has been quietly giggling to themselves for the last quarter century.
today at 7:21 PM
The two people were Bob Reiter and Jerry Solinas. Jerry wrote in a 2015 email to Daniel Bernstein that he thought it was a hash of the passphrase. I corroborated that story with 4 people, including two ex-NSA folks off the record.
Everyone was wrong!
I wasn't able to reach Bob. He was working in private industry as of 2018, but never responded.
today at 9:07 PM
Kind of sus that they would spread a rumor that its a phrase. This isnt something I would forget, or confuse with a timestamp..
today at 10:03 PM
It's possible that this "phrase hash" method was used for a different case - like another, unrelated and possibly unreleased algorithm. And then it was confused for the one used for those curves.
today at 9:04 PM
or they were lying...
today at 7:20 PM
Someone just posted this:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=eOQfNT6Jdkg
today at 7:53 PM
> Someone
> https://www.youtube.com/@steveweis4786
FTA: This work was conducted at Anthropic by [...], and Steve Weis.
I wonder how much time he spent on the video relative to the other stuff
today at 8:41 PM
A buddy did it with Claude, so zero time.
today at 9:42 PM
Oh I even saw your other posts in this thread but didn't recognize the name. So much for my research skills
today at 10:16 PM
I mean, at least you didn’t spend the last 20 years hashing 2^51 sentences in your research.
today at 7:23 PM
Genuine question, how many days of your life have you had to spend on this particular tinfoil convention?
today at 7:41 PM
Some previous discussions started based on these posts: https://blog.cryptographyengineering.com/2015/10/22/a-riddle... https://eprint.iacr.org/2015/1018
today at 7:38 PM
Video is meant as a joke, it’s common to edit the subtitles of this video to alternate ones
today at 9:21 PM
Tptacek is an expert in this field. I imagine he's had to spend a considerable amount of time explaining why ECDSA probably aren't nerfed.
today at 7:48 PM
That's one of the best executed implementations of that joke I've seen in years.
today at 7:25 PM
understanding Spanish throws it off, but this is hilarious either way. LOL
today at 7:48 PM
I understand Spanish being from Latin America but for a long time I couldn't understand a single thing he said because of the Spaniard accent and crazy laughter, and I enjoyed the memes just fine. But then few years ago I watched it with the real subtitles and something clicked in my brain so now when I watch it I mostly understand him fine. But now the memes are ruined because it's hard to hear and read two speeches at the same time. Just an annecdote about our weird brains.
today at 9:18 PM
Just to add here that this guy doesn't have a "standard" Spanish accent. He was from AndalucĂa (I don't remember where exactly), a region rather known for its accent being difficult for even native speakers to understand.
Anyway after I moved to AndalucĂa I now can understand the story he tells, but I have to pay close attention!
today at 8:33 PM
Is this like what Downfall is like for Germans?
today at 7:28 PM
> The fifth binary seed, B-163, fits nothing Claude has tried and remains unexplained.
The simplest explanation would be that it was generated the same way as the others, but somebody mistyped a digit somewhere along the way to publishing, and therefore a solution could not be found with the assumption that the number is correct.
today at 7:46 PM
This is also why one of the Zodiac ciphers remained unsolved for so long. The dude made a mistake in his transcription.
today at 7:51 PM
Very well possible. I’m glad to see that this is all above board in the end, which further argues the case AGAINST conspiracy theories. Most people are just trying to do the right thing.
today at 9:14 PM
Sorry, US intelligence agencies is not a category of organizations I would sort in the "we're just trying to do the right thing" bucket.
I dont even mean that as a dig to the people working there (although maybe some) they're literally a military wing of the worlds most powerful empire..
Lets be honest with ourselves, their job is to spy on people, and spies try to make their job easier not harder.
Hell it seems they did lie about the origins, which should bring their entire motivation into question. They spread rumors that it was a "silly phrase", thats ridiculous.
today at 7:02 PM
13 years of tinfoil hats for srand48(time(NULL)
today at 7:16 PM
But the friends we made along the way!...
today at 7:25 PM
> 13 years of tinfoil hats for srand48(time(NULL)
Probably not quite this given the timestamps span over almost a year (but have some clustering in August 1997).
Given that the spread suggests they weren't just now() timestamps it would actually be interesting to know what the significance of the timestamps is, if any. Though it could be something boring like randomly sampling some local file creation times.
today at 10:15 PM
Those are the dates that the NSA obtained quantum computer tech from the alien crash site at Roswell, which would enable them to break the crypto they were currently building
today at 7:12 PM
This is devastating news... for an entire generation of NIST cryptography conspiracy theories.
today at 8:08 PM
It’s perplexing that NIST chose to burn so much trust and goodwill with the independent cryptography community instead of just explaining empirically that they really had nothing up their sleeve.
today at 8:25 PM
I think they legitimately did not know. The person who worked on it directly, Jerry Solinas, did not remember and gave an explanation that turned out to be wrong. In his defense, multiple people told the same story about hashing a phrase that was wrong.
If they did know, they could have handed over these timestamps 15 years ago and put the issue to bed.
today at 8:14 PM
It was a very different time back then.
today at 10:07 PM
What was so different, culturally?
today at 10:18 PM
Well the thing that comes to mind for me was the US gov classing encryption as a munition and placing it under export controls
today at 8:30 PM
If they deny everything they didn't do, then whatever they don't deny will stand out.
today at 8:19 PM
"independent cryptography community" - I actually LOLed at this
I don't think that "community" would accept any kind of answer as truthful so why waste the time...
today at 8:22 PM
It’s independently verifiable. What do you mean?
today at 8:59 PM
One of the top comments in this very thread suggests the seed timestamps were maybe selected specifically for purpose.
today at 8:46 PM
So it’s pretty clear that Anthropic is privately trying to break cryptography.
today at 9:34 PM
I see it as: they're all trying really hard problems that aren't in the training data, to gauge if their models are improving, achieved by looking at problem that humans haven't been able to solve yet. The evidence to this is all the problems being publicized in the last few weeks.
today at 9:53 PM
Or, less favourably: they are burning a ton of tokens on any random "hard" tasks they can think of to try and generate stories about AI doing amazing things to pump the hype, infinite monkeys theorem as a playbook. You only advertise the ones you succeed on, thus pushing the idea that's what they do routinely. Stochastic "genius".
today at 10:07 PM
If it was insecure and they found it first, that'd be better than many alternative actors who would eventually find the same exploit.
today at 9:48 PM
As are all companies working in quantum computing.
today at 7:23 PM
> is it suspicious that such an obvious thing wasn’t discovered in 25 years?
Ouch. The implied judgment of us humans stings there.
today at 9:59 PM
Seriously though, how did nobody find this? It's not like you needed an LLM to check the random number generator. Given how much interest there was by cryptography people it is surprising.
today at 8:15 PM
Did that clanker call us dumb? Scorch the skies, this means war.
today at 7:13 PM
This neat and all but I think there's a bigger issue here. Anthropic (and whoever Anthropic wants) can do this kind of work with Claude, but if you or I try to do it, we will get blocked. This is a fun exercise, but extend this to something much more nefarious and you can see a moat widening between the model providers, their government partners, and the public.
The only thing that bridges this moat is continued advancement of open models.
today at 8:11 PM
> [The model's authors] can do this kind of work with Claude, but if you or I try to do it, we will get blocked.
If this seems concerning, wait until the models get effective enough (gets work done properly at a lower energy need than humans have) that there's no reason for them to release anything. Why offer your weights for download or grant any third party usage access when you can just do the actual job yourself and collect all that turnover?
today at 8:44 PM
> Why offer your weights for download or grant any third party usage access when you can just do the actual job yourself and collect all that turnover?
It's hilarious how a the trillions invested in AI companies, and their valuations are predicated on the AI labs Sherlocking entire industries, and yet CEOs, mathematicians, and everyone else are eagerly feeding the beast their most prized information.
today at 9:01 PM
What else should we do? It's not like we had any choice.
today at 9:14 PM
What? You have the choice of just not. Or if you absolutely must to put food on the table, you don't need to fucking cheer as you do it!
today at 9:23 PM
This is a risky proposition if the technology is in some way revolutionary. The people who decided to "just not" with, for example, the internet often aren't doing business anymore.
today at 9:52 PM
The internet was inherently decentralized. This is inherently centralizing. The direction of travel is opposite.
today at 8:20 PM
They will just have someone look at every question, they will let it pass, want a cut or deny it. Claude, you can answer this guys question, but don't tell 'em how you solved it and don't give him the best answer, give him an ok answer.
today at 9:04 PM
That's already happening. The public models aren't anything like their internal models.
today at 8:38 PM
That's kinda unrealistic, isn't it? How will they pay for the thousands or ten thousands of employees, who need to look at every question? And most questions are just ordinary BS, that not really anyone other than the asker cares about. Giant waste of time to check all that.
today at 8:43 PM
A lesser model can supervise.
today at 8:55 PM
Why can't Claude do that itself?
today at 8:48 PM
Just wait till the AI does that to humans in general.
today at 8:37 PM
This is why open weights and continued model distillation to improve model evolution is imperative.
Do you trust the people who would gate these capabilities? I do not.
today at 8:50 PM
I mean I want this to, just don't get your hopes to high because it's not long till they get dashed.
I don't think it will be too long before models are considered munitions and having the weights for one will require registration.
today at 9:05 PM
Which brings us back to the war on general computation. So long as people can have computers that they control, at least in one of the countries or regions, there's no putting this cat back in the bag and we are all along for the ride
Sometimes I want a fast-forward button for life, the times are so exciting and I want to know what else 8B people can think of next but there's so far no way to turn pages faster ^^'
today at 10:19 PM
This is a bit silly.
There are just a few places where the most high tech hardware is made. If we turned off new and unregistered hardware now it would be just a few years as most hardware fast enough to run LLMs would disappear from public hands.
It will still exist, but be in the hands of militaries and authoritarian governments. If you piddle around on the net showing off your open standards you'll be relentlessly attacked by these entities digitally. More so, those areas will be generally embargoed.
The future looks like a new cold war with a lot more digital weapons.
today at 9:11 PM
today at 8:57 PM
French Revolution and the 21st centuries version of guillotines, whatever that could be, is probably a good reason to avoid that.
There's also a thing called commodity fetishism but capitalists usually learn the hard way that things created with machines without human input miss the essence of why we're willing to pay for something. Its why a handmade watch is $100k and a casio is $100, or a handmade sweater identical to a machine made goes for 10x.
They could also just make us so poor and anxious that we beg to fight eachother in wars.
today at 9:21 PM
Another labor theory of value patient.
today at 9:34 PM
Gun to your head, you have to see one of two movies with the same plot and characters. They are identical movies.
One is produced by 500 humans collaborating and the second is completely generated by an AI that can actually make a movie
A single individual or small group of people who own the GPUs profit from the AI version, and the human version provides a salary to 500 humans/families.
Which one are you buying tickets for and choosing to spend 2 hours watching?
today at 10:01 PM
> they are identical movies
today at 7:26 PM
Maybe, but that's what the cyber program is for. Nobody knew if the seed was fine or a backdoor. If it was a backdoor, and Claude helped you find it as a normal person, Anthropic would get bad PR. If you're a verified security researcher, actually that's fantastic and Anthropic would get good PR and everybody claps.
Anthropic wants to IPO, they don't want another Fable shutdown situation.
To be clear I would prefer the cyber safeguards to be less restrictive, I think they're currently too much. I often go to open models because of it. But there are likelier reasons to restrict cyber than world domination.
today at 7:42 PM
> Maybe, but that's what the cyber program is for
> and Claude helped you find it as a normal person, Anthropic would get bad PR
Why are we celebrating and encouraging the walling off of the global intellectual columns?
The idea that you can't reverse engineer things, make things, learn about biology or physics without permission is strange to me. These machines have been trained on the sum intellectual output of humanity, the global intellectual commons, and are being used to close off that commons?
I would be OK with their right to create such restrictions if they weren't lobbying the Government to restrict others, thereby ensuring that they control humanity's intellectual commons well into the future.
Who are they to say what I can learn or can't learn? Who are they to control what I can or can't do with these tools?
Perhaps I'm naive, but I think it's better for humans and the machines if we can all think, learn and build. But then again, I'm the kind of person who rejects the doomer pill.
Reject this.
today at 9:44 PM
Because AI-assisted hacking is not something we should allow to run rampant with the most advanced models, prior to AI-assited cybersecurity catching up.
today at 8:10 PM
> The idea that you can't reverse engineer things, make things, learn about biology or physics without permission is strange to me. These machines have been trained on the sum intellectual output of humanity, the global intellectual commons, and are being used to close off that commons?
I mean this is the standard of biochem research right now. You can't just order 50 gallons of TNT off Amazon and neither can you get live viruses from a lab just because you want to do research.
today at 8:32 PM
OK, so then no problem, why are Anthropic restricting my ability to learn and reason?
today at 8:59 PM
Because they can and there is no law against it.
And really they aren't restricting any of that. I've never had Claude stop me from going to the library and reading a book.
You don't have a legal right to do anything you want with their model. And if you don't like that you are going to have to convince politicians to enact new laws to change that.
today at 8:10 PM
Because there are good and bad people in the world, and if I ask Claude "how do I make cocaine" and it gives me a thorough recipe, it doesn't know if I'm being intellectually curious or trying to become the next Pablo Escobar. They're Anthropic, and because they made Claude, they get to say what we can do with it. Which, I agree, is total bullshit. If I buy a Ford car and I can do whatever I want with it. Drive to work, drive for Uber, set it on fire; plowing into a crowd of protestors is covered by existing laws against vehicular manslaughter. Ford doesn't get a say. But because cars are so ubiquitous and a known technology, there's no blowback to Ford if I commit crimes with my car that I bought from them. If I commit crimes and Claude helped, Anthropic is gonna get sued (there's already litigation against the labs for deaths), and they don't want that.
In a properly free market, we'd have regulations that prohibit labs from vertical integration so they have to release and sell a model and another company hosts it and sell access to it. Americanism, America's implementation of capitalism doesn't have such regulations though (and how would that even work?) so we're stuck with Anthropic having that power.
The fear, justified or not, is that a terrorist is going to use Claude to make sarin nerve gas and bomb subway stations, or the digital equivalent. Could you live with that on your conscience? I don't think I could, but fortunately for me, I don't work at Anthropic so don't have to answer that real life trolly problem.
today at 8:46 PM
>if I ask Claude "how do I make cocaine"
I am amazed at how a technical gloss can obscure basic rights. That's legal! It's in chemistry / agronomy books, freely available in libraries. I have the right to tell you how that is done, and you have the right to read what I write.
today at 8:54 PM
Because this is how the world works
An LLM isn't a book. You can still go buy the books you want. An LLM, especially as they get more advanced, are agents. You can ask them do to things and they can interact with tools to do things.
You're free to print a cocaine book. You're not free to incorporate it into a cocaine making machine without violating numerous laws.
today at 9:36 PM
You are entirely free to build a cocaine making machine in most countries. It is actually using it to produce cocaine that is a crime.
In reasonable countries, this is exactly how it works. You can own lockpicks, practice picking locks, and even publish detailed instructions on how to pick locks. It's only when you pick someone else's lock that a crime is committed.
Limiting access to tools and knowledge benefits the wealthy and privileged. Knowledge should proliferate, that is how the world has worked long before I was born and god willing that is how it will work long after I die.
today at 9:30 PM
You are entirely free to build a cocaine making machine in most countries. It is actually using it to produce cocaine that is a crime.
In reasonable countries, this is exactly how it works. You can own lockpicks, practice picking locks, and even publish detailed instructions on how to pick locks. It's only when you pick someone else's lock that a crime is committed.
Limiting access to tools and knowledge benefits the wealthy and privileged.
today at 9:33 PM
I have some bad news for you about what happens if the cops find you with lockpicking tools.
today at 9:18 PM
You can program a computer to do things and they can interact with tools to do things too. Doesn't justify restricting what you can do with them.
If you program a computer to make cocaine for you, you're the one violating the law. If you ask an LLM to do the same for you, you're the one violating the law. The LLM's capabilities are irrelevant.
today at 10:14 PM
You sweet summer child.
Cool, so I'll have you make an LLM that can make cosine, then I'll provide you paid access to the machine to can ask the right question to do it illegally. Then when you get caught and blame me we'll both be in court defending ourselves.
You're argument is "doesn't justify". This is a private corporation, not a government. There is no freedom of speech law involved here if the corporation says no. Now, when the government tells LLM corporations that there are limits they will gladly agree.
Next, the government will classify the LLMs as munitions and you'll be spending the next 50 years fighting on reversing that when a big chunk of the population is anti-AI enough to let them do it. After that will be bans and registration on hardware.
There are two things that you are confusing. One is what you'd like to happen in an open data world like existed after the cold war. And then there is what is going to happen, and it's going to be messy, authoritarian, and closed. And you will lose the openness that had been occurring up to this point.
There is no world in which the general public agrees to wide open access to info-hazards, and there are people that will ensure enough disasters happen to close that future.
today at 8:59 PM
Ford actually will tell you now if you can or cannot do something with their vehicles. They’re also likely tracking you.
That said - there likely were the same issues with cars in early days and then we got a body of settled case law that let the car companies off the hook for this and put responsibility on the user unless a manufacturing defect was the cause.
In the case of models, knowledge has historically always been dangerous! Is the library liable if a kid figures out how to do chemistry and builds a device? What about YouTube? I find it hard to believe this would hold up in court over time. So far, the only cases I’ve seen are when AI has encouraged self-harm which does in fact seem like a legit defect.
Gatekeeping knowledge like this will only serve to enable those that break the law, not protect, in my judgment.
And just so this isn’t pure fodder for the machine - torch staple must of course infant music verb noun right? :)
today at 8:50 PM
>use Claude to make sarin nerve gas and bomb subway stations, or the digital equivalent. Could you live with that on your conscience?
People have always been able to do this before Claude. The information is out there and if you use a VPN there's not much they can do. The existence of information isn't the blocker for why attacks don't happen.
today at 8:56 PM
This is so undershooting of what LLMs are capable of it's no wonder you're thinking they are just like books.
today at 10:16 PM
You sound highly optimistic about the capabilities of LLMs, which makes me curious about the path you see to furthering quality of life at scale. What do you see as the main obstacles to LLMs brewing me beer on demand at my home without involving me past the prompt, and when do you foresee we'll overcome them?
today at 7:56 PM
>Maybe, but that's what the cyber program is for.
I have been in the cyber program since around the time it first went public and recently renewed it with the updated program.
You still trivially hit guadrails. I was trying to reverse engineer some bit of 20-year-old software that already has known, unmitigated exploits and it still downgraded me.
today at 8:11 PM
> that's what the cyber program is for
open weights are the better way imo, no elite gatekeepers please
today at 7:45 PM
> But there are likelier reasons to restrict cyber than world domination.
I mean, greed alone would seem to be enough, and it would be fully worth calling out as bullshit.
today at 7:29 PM
> Anthropic would get bad PR
I think the current administration would delight in harsher penalties
today at 7:35 PM
Anthropic gets zero of my money because their favorite word is no. I cannot figure out how to as an individual or a small startup request elevated permissions for the purposes of anything that they think might potentially be dangerous for someone who is not me to access. I have a background in cybersecurity. I have a background in life sciences. Can I put those skills to use to benefit humanity? Who knows.
today at 8:23 PM
I imagine the path forward for the labs will be signing off on organizations/institutions rather than individuals.
The risk/reward is way lopsided towards risk for the labs to vet individuals. Much easier to get an organization and have them take the blast if someone/something goes off the rails.
I cannot in any universe see the labs putting themselves in a "We should never had given this person access" situation.
today at 8:22 PM
> I cannot figure out how to as an individual or a small startup request elevated permissions…
https://support.claude.com/en/articles/14604842-cyber-verifi...
https://portal.anthropic.com/programs/cvp
today at 9:23 PM
"No."
Dario keeps saying in interviews that AI hacking is not a problem because "the good guys will protect themselves with AI", but then gate-keeps.
I submitted the form and it was rejected without reason.
Now what?
today at 9:51 PM
Thank you for the link.
It looks like I will have to pay them to be considered, and even so, it looks unlikely that I'll be approved, since I have no CVEs credited to me, and I do not publicly post about security concerns.
..........................................
The Cyber Verification Program is not available on free plans, so we are unable to approve you for the program.
If your plan changes, you're welcome to apply again at any time.
Regards,
The Anthropic Safeguards Team
..........................................
It has a cooldown of seven days.
today at 7:33 PM
I feel like history is repeating itself - to many people AOL, Compuserve, MSN, et al seemed superior to "the web" in the early 1990s because they dumped money into making it slicker, licensed content, provided guardrails, made it easy for non-tech people... They had slick ads, were cultural phenoms, and people would take sides with the companies and think their arguments were strong and even obvious!
today at 7:27 PM
I worked on this specific task myself, using Claude, and I was not blocked (although I did not succeed!)
today at 7:51 PM
Can you be sure that the model was not constrained for you, regardless? Since they can’t help too much with cyber, they might avoid some routes to not get completely flagged and that could influence for not finding the solution.
today at 7:56 PM
I have seen behaviour a little like what you describe, in other tasks. When I was cracking the keys for Sony's camera firmware updates, Claude steered away from an obfuscated library, seemingly because it thought it might be related to licensing checks. It was indeed related to licensing checks, but also firmware update decryption. I had to explicitly tell Claude to write a deobfuscator for it, which it did, and eventually I had the keys.
I later got Claude to crack their licensing checks too, by convincing it to write a "license checker" program, and then a second "test case generator" script for the license checker... (Opus 4.8 was smart enough to see what I was doing, but Opus 4.6 complied)
today at 7:36 PM
A form of being blocked is sandbagging the models
today at 7:40 PM
I saw no evidence of sandbagging. And since it was an open problem, there'd be no reasonable way to "steer away" from the correct solution.
today at 8:29 PM
Same. I tried it just a few days ago. This news made me almost jump out of bed.
today at 7:27 PM
Same!
today at 7:16 PM
I'm skeptical that this particular task would get blocked, though I could be wrong. But I agree that the moat is a problem in the general case.
today at 7:20 PM
I don't know about cryptography, but if you try anything in organic chemistry or biology, you virtually always get flagged and downgraded.
As this is going on, Anthropic has opened up their own biology lab.
> https://www.reuters.com/world/anthropic-quietly-sets-up-biol...
There is very much a situation where people in frontier labs have access to exceptional capabilities that are being kept from the rest of us, and they're using it to strip-mine technical and scientific problems.
today at 8:32 PM
I ran into this situation and was able to work around it by running a jailbroken Chinese model that turned out to be quite capable. I think it was Qwen.
today at 7:25 PM
Strip mining is a great phrase here, thank you
today at 7:40 PM
I can't take any credit for it. I believe Terence Tao coined it first. He also wrote a bit about it here: https://mathstodon.xyz/@tao/117237320796901560
today at 7:30 PM
Agree.-
They sure as hell ain't stripteasing :)
today at 7:46 PM
The strip teasing is all of their capability gating.
today at 8:07 PM
Come to think of it, indeed.-
today at 8:01 PM
> There is very much a situation where people in frontier labs have access to exceptional capabilities that are being kept from the rest of us, and they're using it to strip-mine technical and scientific problems.
If these capabilities were available to the public, someone somewhere would make a biological weapon or create a virus we've never seen before that could kill many millions of people.
Stanford researchers have demonstrated it’s possible [1].
[1]: "AI creates 16 new viruses from scratch, showing promise for drug resistance and drawing warnings about potential for misuse" - https://www.cnn.com/2026/08/06/health/ai-viruses-bacteriopha...
today at 9:29 PM
Biologists already addressed this idiocy a few weeks ago [1]. Making a biological weapon requires facilities that only some nation states and comparable companies, have access to.
AI isn't going to magically assemble a DNA sequence for you and a computer design is not a guarantee of something that works.
AI restrictionists love to pretend that their toys will, with the power of intelligence, magically bypass fundamental limitations of reality to conjure up fantastical weapons of mass destruction if they throw enough computers at the task. Unfortunately for them, that is not how the world works.
[1] https://www.businessinsider.com/researchers-ai-apocalypse-sk...
today at 8:29 PM
We already have controls for that: we control access to the reagents and equipment needed. Yknow, like we always have.
Information is not dangerous. This is a ridiculous argument to me, but maybe my chemistry degree has me biased.
today at 9:26 PM
Not to mention that making an actual novel virus requires thousands of dollars of equipment, serious lab skills, and even then is so dangerous that the wannabe terrorist is more likely to infect and kill themselves than cause mass causalities.
It's the equivalent of making pipe bombs at home.
The instructions are out in the public, but that's not a problem because the idiots that make pipe bombs blow themselves up more often than they succeed in doing terrorism.
today at 7:32 PM
Broadly, the downgrading is still way too heavy-handed and clumsy. As of yesterday “How easy to crack is WPA2” downgraded to opus 4.8. Granted I could probably have phrased it differently and gotten a response, but the point is I shouldn’t have to. It can’t simultaneously be smart enough to reverse the ECDSA curve seed and not smart enough not to destroy the world by answering a trivial question with a scary word in it.
today at 7:20 PM
At minimum we don't have access to "Claude thoughts" like the ones the article highlighted, right? That's part of the hidden reasoning?
today at 7:36 PM
Fable 5.1 has downgraded me in the past week alone for the crimes of describing a coordinating server as "the C&C server" ([cyber]), for doing some statistical analysis on some toy Vigenère-ciphered text ([cyber]), and for asking it to help me find patterns in some semi-random text ([bio]), so it is fair to say I am not skeptical.
today at 7:28 PM
I have access to Claude's "defensive" cyber model and it appears to take no issue with the prompt, but I suspect that is because it uses today's publication as the basis for an answer.
In the past my attempts to work on crypto related problems have been met with needing the higher tier of "offensive" access.
today at 7:17 PM
It doesn't matter what is blocked today, it matters what is blocked tomorrow.
If we allow these providers to promote regulatory capture they become the arbiter of what anyone is "allowed" to do
today at 9:48 PM
I think when the open source models catch up (likely soon) we'll long for the days when companies could control it like this. I could easily see a teenager with openclaw and a single prompt causing millions of dollars in damage. Multiply that by the number of stupid people in the world and we have a problem.
today at 9:59 PM
Moat must have been written more times in the last 12 months than in all of history before that time.
today at 7:15 PM
I know Anthropic models have a lot of insane, paranoid filters, but I don't remember them blocking cryptography work last I checked (some 3 months ago now).
today at 7:47 PM
I routinely get rejected on elliptic curve related requests; often I can talk Claude back into some work on it. But it is surprisingly sensitive to talking about research cryptography in my experience. I’m not in their cyber program.
today at 7:29 PM
3 months ago is like years ago in the current AI landscape
today at 7:37 PM
The cyber filter blocks really basic stuff all the time. People who are pro that bs should be forced to only eat with a spoon for the rest of their life.
today at 8:34 PM
For me it refused to move Claude transcripts from point A to point B on my local machine. It kept getting flagged as reasoning extraction or something. The line of "It's my machine, I can move files wherever I want" shouldn't be crossed. Someday file managers are going to go extinct and LLMs will organize everything, and they shouldn't choose what files you can and can't access on your own computer.
today at 7:47 PM
If you have a variable `const char *shellcode` in a fizzbuzz function, it is enough for it to lose its mind.
today at 7:54 PM
It stopped me from doing basic bit operations. I have looked around and others have the same problem.
today at 7:32 PM
> moat widening between the model providers, their government partners, and the public.
Part of me wonders whether the NSA/other TLA has either (a) an unrestricted model from a lab with less scruples like SpaceX, or (b) an in-house model, either abliterated or with data they've bought themselves.
today at 7:26 PM
Anyone can do this kind of work with a model as simple as GLM 5.3 or Kimi K3
today at 9:19 PM
As much as I dislike the guardrails, they are absolutely irrelevant to this task, and you will not get blocked.
today at 9:10 PM
Why would you be blocked? I cannot imagine why you would be for this specific task unless the supposed backdoor turned out to be real.
today at 7:35 PM
How do you know this to be true? I am not disagreeing; I genially need to understand why or if others are seeing blockers that I don't see or if I am seeing blockers that they do not see.
Are their guardrail benchmarks or anything of the sort that we can use to see where the bifurcation of permission/capability occurs?
today at 8:38 PM
Open models are just as quick to refuse to do stuff, in my experience.
today at 7:41 PM
Compute has always been gated. This is nothing new. If we look at the HPC space, many of the largest clusters were restricted access and used by governments organizations. Even the ones with "public" access, not just anyone could get access to it.
today at 7:22 PM
JFYI, this is not true. I do stuff like this all the time.
today at 8:06 PM
Whenever I say that the rich have access to much more capable and unrestricted models I get downvotes. Yet here we have another example.
today at 7:15 PM
More and more it is the relentlessness of the models that strikes me. Leave no stone unturned! Go through ALL of these old boxes. Someone said they thought maybe it was over there somewhere >>shrug<<
today at 7:33 PM
I find it so ridiculous that they (seemingly) forcefully try to state references to dedicated researchers who devoted much of their lives to the problem, while the LLM does not even know which trained papers were effectively used. That means likely many researchers not listed were heavily influencing this achievement, and Claude does not even know that they helped. And the world doesn't know.
today at 7:40 PM
This happens in academia all the time. You read a ton of papers, chat with tons of people about tons of ideas.
Later you come up some idea, you do the experiment, write the paper, search for relevant citations when you write the intro.
Honestly I think this is actually desirable. For a mind to work well and do things creatively and efficiently it can't be a simple search engine, it needs to blend and meld and reform the information.
And that means the output can't be cleanly deterministically linked to the input. Unless you just keep a log then cite everything you've ever read in your life (and all the conversations and talks too).
today at 7:35 PM
Sounds entirely reasonable to me. They tried to give some credit. The main contribution is the solution that Claude came up with.
today at 7:46 PM
Maybe someone already figured it out, but it is well covered somewhere. And Claude just used it. I wonder if we ever know for sure.
today at 8:06 PM
Claude seems to be fairly good at bruteforcing/testing/etc on it's own, it solved a fairly intricate thing while I was busy on other things.
I've adapted a crypto-lib for TLS connections and had a mistake during negotation that truncated some algo-selection value, worked up until the other party started trialling post-quantum algorthims that apparently had algo-id's that collided with the truncated values I was using.
Claude figured out that from the code and trialling TLS handshakes.
Besides, since there was a bounty on finding the curve it seems unlikely that someone would've found out and not shared that? (unless working at a security service that figured out that it was possible to attack?)
today at 7:59 PM
Wouldn't they have claimed the bounty?
today at 8:04 PM
If they thought it to be backdoor, why not sell for some other believer who pays more than the bounty? But anyway, not everyone is after money and fame.
today at 7:40 PM
> The main contribution is the solution that Claude came up with.
That's an argument that must be infuriating to all researchers who ever published a paper on that topic, because most likely Claude was trained with all of them.
today at 7:41 PM
I suppose so, but it's still the case.
today at 8:38 PM
How is that any different from a human that learned from another researcher or paper?
today at 9:35 PM
today at 7:48 PM
I think it's only a matter of time before we decrypt the Voynich manuscript and the fourth message of Kryptos.
https://beinecke.library.yale.edu/beinecke/collections/beine...
https://allthatsinteresting.com/kryptos
today at 10:01 PM
the null hypothesis for Voynich is that it was generated by some random process, like asemic writing, assembling bits from tables and copy/paste/edit. there are some reasons this is plausible (the entropy of Voynich words is low for language, there aren't scribal corrections etc), but fundamentally the "ancient hoax" hypothesis can't be proven, only disproven (since there's so much freedom of choice in generating garbage that it's not a compact explanation.)
so frustratingly, if it is an ancient hoax we can't ever prove it. all we would observe is that we haven't deciphered it, but failing to decipher isn't proof that there's nothing to decipher.
today at 7:20 PM
> None of them were the results of any hash algorithm at all, but rather the output of the C library’s lrand48 random-number generator, seeded with a Unix timestamp!
Could they not be both?
today at 7:26 PM
Extremely unlikely - these are very sparse domains.
today at 9:17 PM
Somebody must have tried attacking old lost Bitcoin wallets on that basis. But so far those early day Bitcoins haven't moved.
today at 7:24 PM
Makes me wonder if any implementations will do the cute trick of dispensing with the seed constants and deriving them at startup from the unix timestamps. :)
today at 7:31 PM
"It is still conceivable that these curves were selected to have a specific property in principle by searching over timestamps to the random number generator."
Indeed! And we guess that OpenAI was gagged by the NSA because the massive proof dump on Oct. 6th did not contain cryptographic results.
I assume that Anthropic faces similar restrictions, so this seems kind of approved.
today at 8:29 PM
I have seen nothing that would make me believe there is a "[gag] by the NSA" preventing frontier labs from publishing cryptographic results.
We published HAWK and McEliece attacks no problem.
today at 8:19 PM
The conspiracy theory going around the Internet is that they (the AI labs) broke cryptography in some way a la last season of HBO's Silicon Valley, and they're keeping the results under wraps until they can steal Bitcoin out of Satoshi's dead wallets, and then use that to pay for GPUs et al.
today at 7:28 PM
Would it have been feasible for a FOIA to reveal the origin from the primary source?
EDIT: ah, one of the linked authors tried that. They had no documentation on it. https://saweis.net/posts/nist-curve-seed-origins.html
today at 8:32 PM
Yep.
NIST closed it: https://www.muckrock.com/foi/united-states-of-america-10/ori...
NSA ignored it: https://www.muckrock.com/foi/united-states-of-america-10/ori...
I think part of it is I don't know how to write these FOIA requests in the right way they can comply with it. I think you need to be more specific.
today at 9:23 PM
thank you for at least trying :)
starts to rebuild trust at least :)
what's one thing that you can actually talk about out of this that might help people to understand that's getting lost?
today at 7:18 PM
Interesting. So there was no humorous phrase, and its probably safe from backdoors. They do look pretty random.
today at 9:56 PM
mda5("Sneed's Feed and Seed (Formerly Chuck's)")
today at 7:27 PM
Setting aside the use of "an internal research model", how would one go about prompting an LLM to do this?
today at 7:33 PM
probably something like:
"read this: https://words.filippo.io/seeds-bounty/ then find the solution to the bounty"
today at 8:12 PM
I wait for the morning that we’ll wake up to ssh keys being useless
today at 10:04 PM
To be clear, this is in no way close to a cryptographic attack.
today at 7:44 PM
As one of the original bounty sponsors, I'm thrilled to pay my portion to ISRG. :)
today at 7:17 PM
today at 7:45 PM
Why did they specifically skip other apparently suitable curve candidates? The B-163 seed and the base point origins of several other curves are still not explained
today at 7:15 PM
today at 9:43 PM
> Let me be careful about the plausibility: is it suspicious that such an obvious thing wasn’t discovered in 25 years?
Alright Claude no need to rub it in.
today at 9:16 PM
crazy
today at 7:40 PM
On the face if it, the big leap here was Claude autonomously envisioning, and deciding to pursue, the "ancient prng + date" angle - - rather than working backwards from the premise of deliberately weakened seeds or some other popular theory. To me that shows creativity, and modelling of the situation and method of the people at the NSA.
So two questions:
1. TFA mentions the "humourous phrase hash" theory, but Claude's trajectory seems to be a long way from that. To what extent was Claude prompted in the ultimately successful direction?
2. Whats with all the "hmm..." in the internal reasoning process log? Do models really do that? And if so, why? Some weird emergent language thing, or just mimicry?
today at 9:14 PM
> 2. Whats with all the "hmm..." in the internal reasoning process log? Do models really do that? And if so, why? Some weird emergent language thing, or just mimicry?
Assuming that is actually the real reasoning trace (open weight model reasoning traces usually do things like switch languages or talk in non-standard English because of model drift, so it's a bit surprising that Claude wouldn't do the same) there was a study a few years ago that found base models produce better answers if you put "take a deep breath" in the prompt[1]. Maybe in the RL training stage stuff like that gets reinforced and because reasoning traces are hidden in RLHF it doesn't get selected out? My money is on it not being the real reasoning trace though.
[1]: https://arxiv.org/abs/2309.03409
today at 9:30 PM
> the "ancient prng + date" angle
I remember hearing this in a cryptanalysis lecture at some point, so it was not a completely novel theory.
Admittedly I am not finding written evidence of this anywhere.
today at 8:16 PM
From the video posted upthread, the vibe I get is that they prompted Claude about the bounty and to approach it from first principles rather than building another clone of John the Ripper.
today at 7:40 PM
today at 7:13 PM
This is huge. It means the Bitcoin and Ethereum communities can now confidently ship the opcodes and precompiled contracts to check ECDSA signatures on P-256 in addition to K-256 curves, and stop worrying about possible NSA backdoors based on the chosen seeds (quantum computers are another story).
I turned out to be right in my advocacy years ago, here is my post: https://ethereum-magicians.org/t/eip-7212-precompiled-for-se...
today at 7:16 PM
Nobody conversant with elliptic curve cryptography research believed there was a backdoor based on these seeds; for a number of reasons, best articulated by Koblitz and Menezes (who took on the question directly).
But it's nice to be able to shut the whole unproductive debate down directly.
today at 7:22 PM
But what if there is a backdoor and just looped the RNG until they find the seeds that will match it. Just in case. /s
today at 7:31 PM
Taking the question seriously (when I wrote this there was no /s), since I think it is still a question some people legitimately have, it is still extremely implausible that such tight dates and such a small number of iterations are all backdoored. For backdoors to be that dense would indicate some sort of serious flaw in the algorithm as a whole as well, something so serious that it should be fairly obvious. If these were initialized from dates, each separated by some billions of years and with the iteration parameters also in the millions or billions or trillions for no apparent reason it would be time to be suspicious.
Is it impossible? It is hard to prove impossible. But this is not what I would expect backdoors to look like.
In fact this makes me think that the information about how these were generated must have been lost very early in the process, or over-compartmentalized away from the wrong people. It seems like the NSA should have been positively delighted to show that these were the origins of the seeds as they are decent "nothing up my sleeve" numbers: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nothing-up-my-sleeve_number Advertising that fact should have been advantageous to the NSA if that is indeed how they were generated, so my best guess is that the parts of the NSA that should have been showing us that must not have themselves known.
today at 7:22 PM
If there’s one thing everyone knows about conspiracy theorists, it’s that they’re willing to accept concrete disproof of their theories. /s
today at 9:36 PM
On September 20th a friend told me that he had as significant number of Anthropic credits that were about to expire and wondered about a use for them. I do not use their products because of their relentless commitment to depriving the public access to artificial intelligence (and particularly any AI that isn't acting on their behalf) and I strongly discourage anyone else from doing so. But since he was going to use the credits for something, I tried to think of a skut work task that would be of only idle curiosity and would not help advance their capability, enable a meaningful public announcement* for them, and was likely already probed by many others (so success would only be lottery effects). -- and basically just something so pointless I wouldn't want to waste my own compute grinding on it but might like to see the result.
So I recommended determining the origins of ECC seeds and base points. The agent worked continuously for many hours and did not uncover anything interesting that wasn't already known. I looked at the transcript and was struck by how idiotic the agent was-- significantly below the standard of intelligence I've come to expect from GLM running locally.
I'm not saying this to suggest that misanthropic hijacked someone elses work yet again-- this is an obvious question that many people have surely posed and success presumably depended on expert use (which was absolutely not applied in my friends example). But it does make me wonder if the company invisibly degraded the model performance.
[*] Seems I underestimated how trivial a result they'd bother trying to spin!
today at 8:04 PM
Neat. Now they should figure out what's up with the secp256k1 curve and its weird generator point G where 1/2 G has 90 leading 0 bits.
today at 7:18 PM
Not entirely related to the topic, but did someone spent some tokens trying to figure out the origins of the "Wow! Signal" (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wow!_signal) ?
today at 7:32 PM
Seems to me like a nothing burger? As long as there is no weakness, why should I care which PRNG shuffled bytes?
today at 8:09 PM
The process to generate these was opaque, so there was some concern that the values might have been backdoored somehow like Dual_EC_DRBG was; we didn't even have confidence that they were generated from a PRNG rather than some other process. Knowing that the values were generated this way makes it much less plausible that there is such a backdoor.
today at 9:09 PM
But you can still analyse the behaviour of the values to identify backdoor behaviour rather than insisting on uncovering the exact method od generation.
Just seems to me like that's quite low on the priority list. I guess this result assures some people that the values are good.
today at 9:04 PM
>like Dual_EC_DRBG was
There is no evidence that it was backdoored.
today at 7:26 PM
As unsurprised as I am by this, and as much as I suspect a lot of people could have guessed it, having Claude confirm it is still fascinating, but.
Somehow, I find these results fascinating, but also quite sad, because we used a machine to solve it at all. I feel like some half drunk motivated graduate level humans could have figured it out too.
Then again, once you know the answer, perhaps you have an obligation to share it, keeping it to yourself might be unfair to everyone else.
Honestly I’m not entirely sure how I feel about all this. I would gladly welcome any groundbreaking work Claude might do to solve hard problems and move the world forward by decades or even centuries.
But these sorts of fun problems feel like things we should avoid pointing LLMs at. They remind me of those weird programming puzzles that are difficult to solve but incredibly fun to work through.
My concern is that if Claude ends up solving all the fun problems, will humans be left with nothing but the hard, headache-inducing ones? Tao had raised a similar concern, problems that graduate students would have been expected to solve and learn the process, are now things you can simply point an LLM at.
I’m still not sure how I will ever reconcile with this feeling, about any of this. I just find it genuinely sad that we might be automating away not only the difficult work, but also the joy of figuring things out for ourselves.
today at 7:22 PM
Stochastic parrot truthers in shambles.
today at 7:32 PM
>“seed” parameter
>provided by the NSA with no explanation or justification.
Really? Nobody is concerned about the NSA just cheerfully dictating that? Smells very rainbow-table-y
today at 7:22 PM
> This is not a cryptographic break, new attack, or weakness in the ECDSA curves. In fact, this makes us more confident the curves were chosen without any backdoors or intentional weaknesses.
Uh… did you talk to any cryptographers? This is EXACTLY what a weak curve would look like. Imagine that 1 in a thousand, or one in a million keys, selected at random, are vulnerable to some withheld attack. This approach lets you vary the timestamp or number of iterations until a weak key is found, then have plausible deniability afterward. This is why modern systems choose constants in a way with no free choice of parameters (e.g. sqrt of 2 for first constant, cube root for second constant, etc.).
They even note later in the article that viable curves in the generator sequence seem to have been skipped.
today at 9:15 PM
Yes. I did speak to a cryptographer.
today at 10:17 PM
Yeah, but did you talk to one that agrees with adastra22's point of view about this?
The rest are idiots, and their opinions are of no merit.
today at 7:25 PM
This is discussed in the post - since the NSA never mentioned how these seeds were created, it seems unlikely that they would develop a cover story that would not be shared and only opened to scrutiny many years later
today at 7:36 PM
today at 7:35 PM
>Uh… did you talk to any cryptographers
google some of the names under the "Who we are" heading